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Approaching a decade of no foreign exchange  





Since June 1997, the Bank of Israel (BOI), has not intervened in the Israeli foreign exchange market.
3 
The non-intervention policy followed a long period of heavy BOI intervention; first as matter of choice 
and later because it had to defend the lower (appreciating) edge of the official crawling exchange rate 
band. 
The purpose of this paper is to explain the reasons for the non-intervention policy and in particular to 
discuss how this policy 
a)  improved the effectiveness of monetary policy; 
b)  contributed to the enhancement of financial stability; 
c)  increased the disciplining force of financial markets on policy makers. 
The paper is organised as follows: section II provides a brief description of the relevant history and the 
institutional setup. Section III discusses how the non-intervention policy enhanced the credibility of the 
inflation targeting framework, thereby increasing the effectiveness of monetary policy. Section IV 
describes how, as a result of non-intervention, the foreign exchange market has developed and 
learned to cope with foreign exchange uncertainty, thus increasing the resilience of Israel’s financial 
system. Section V discusses how the non-intervention policy (and the policy of promoting the 
development of financial markers) led to greater discipline being imposed by financial markets on 
policy makers. Section VI describes conditions under which foreign exchange intervention might be 
useful. Section VII offers a conclusion. 
II.  History and the institutional setup 
Throughout its existence Israel had a long history of foreign exchange intervention, which at different 
times was carried out for different purposes. From the mid-1980s to about the mid-1990s stabilising 
the exchange rate by foreign exchange intervention was used first to reduce inflation from a three-digit 
level and then to keep it within or close to a range of 15-20% a year. 
Initially the exchange rate was pegged to the US dollar and then to a basket of currencies. Later a 
horizontal band was introduced, replaced subsequently by an upward sloping band (which widened 
through time) to reflect the difference between inflation in Israel and inflation abroad. Then, as a result 
of the realisation that Israel had no choice but to join the worldwide trend of reducing inflation to its 
current low level, an inflation targeting framework was introduced in 1992, but its full implications 
becoming apparent only in 1994. 
In that year, the BOI began use the short-term interest rate as its main tool to achieve the inflation 
target. Foreign exchange intervention nevertheless continued with the aim of keeping the exchange 
rate at the publicly declared mid-point of the crawling band. The attempt to use the interest rate to 
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achieve the inflation target and at the same time use foreign exchange intervention to prevent the 
exchange rate moving too far away from the mid-point of the band led to a long period of large capital 
imports which the BOI sterilised at increasing costs and to growing public criticism. 
This development led the BOI to declare on 2 February 1996 that it would no longer intervene as long 
as the exchange rate was within the official band. The change of policy in did not stop the continued 
appreciation of the domestic currency, the new shekel, and eventually the exchange rate reached the 
lower (appreciating) edge of the band and remained there for more than six months. The massive 
foreign exchange purchases during the period February 1996 to June 1997 (more than US$8 billion) 
were again sterilised by the BOI. The main sterilisation instrument was interest-bearing deposits of 
commercial banks at the BOI. When these deposits, which grew very fast, became a major source of 
the commercial banks’ profits it was realised that the sterilisation policy was not sustainable. 
Consequently, on 17 June 1997 the purchases stopped and the BOI has not intervened in the foreign 
exchange market since (Table 1). On that day, an asymmetric change in the slopes of the band was 
introduced; 6% for the upper limit and 4% for the lower limit. Two additional decreases in the slope of 
the lower limit took place; in August 1998 it was reduced to two percent and in December 2001 it was 
reduced to zero. The width of the band today is 82% and it is growing each year. The position of the 
BOI is that it should have been eliminated a long time ago, but so far the government has chosen not 
to do so. The band has not been a problem for monetary policy for some years now, but until it is 
removed it has the potential to become one again. It should be pointed out that the BOI cannot 
unilaterally discard the band altogether. The exchange rate band is part of the exchange rate regime, 




Changes in exchange rate band’s width 
 and foreign exchange intervention 




Distance of ER from 
lower limit (percent) 
1994–1997 H1  13  $16 billion  3 
1997 H2–1999  37  $0.4 billion  8 
2000-2004 60  0  14 
 
III.  The effect of non-intervention policy on monetary policy 
The non-intervention policy enhanced the effectiveness of monetary policy in several ways. First, it 
freed an important channel of the monetary transmission mechanism, namely the exchange rate. 
Thus, as Elkayam (2003) shows, the response of inflation to a 1% shock in the key rate is three times 
larger in the non-intervention policy period than previously. Second, the end of sterilisation operations 
in June 1997 contributed over time to a realisation that the danger of fiscal dominance was averted 
and that the Israeli regime looked more like a monetary-dominant one (Liviatan, 2003). During the 
heavy sterilisation period, monetary policy was in effect close to the dire consequence of facing a 
situation described by Sargent and Wallace (1981) as “unpleasant monetary arithmetic“. Third, the 
credibility of the inflation targeting regime increased in the non-intervention policy period as compared 
to previous periods. Brenner and Sokoler (2001) show that in the non-intervention policy period the 
response of inflation expectations to changes in the key rate was in the expected direction and quite 
large, about 0.7% for every percentage point change of the key rate. Prior to that period changes in 
the key rate did not affect inflation expectations.  
In short, the increased effectiveness of monetary policy, due in large part to the non-intervention 
policy, shortened the period in which heavy monetary restraint was necessary, first to reduce inflation 
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(see Cukierman, 2003), which placed the BOI in a better position to deal effectively with the numerous 
and various shocks which Israel’s economy faces continuously. 
It is no accident that the last stage of ending inflation, stabilising inflation expectations around 2% per 
year, and reducing the BOI key rate to western countries’ levels, began shortly after foreign exchange 
intervention stopped. 
Figure 1 


























Coping with foreign exchange risk 
Greater exchange rate flexibility and reduced direct foreign exchange intervention are normally 
associated with larger exchange rate variability. Some authors, eg, Eichengreen, Hausmann and 
Panizza (2003) argue that higher exchange rate volatility leads to higher costs of hedging foreign 
exchange risk, thus discouraging hedging and hence exacerbating the currency mismatch problem. 
Israel’s experience runs contrary to this argument and supports the opposite view as in Goldstein and 
Turner (2004), Martinez and Werner (2001) and Bleakly and Cowan (2002). The evidence from Israel 
indicates that the incentive to hedge grows when there is no foreign exchange central bank 
intervention and the exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate. 
The awareness of the Israeli business sector that coping with foreign exchange risk was its 
responsibility grew especially after the Russian - LTCM crisis of October-November 1998. During 
these two months the exchange rate depreciated by 11%, exposing the consequences of a large 
currency mismatch in the business sector. At that time there was heavy pressure on the BOI to sell 
foreign exchange reserves in order to stabilise the exchange rate and improve the balance sheet of 
the business sector. The central bank withstood the pressures and did not intervene. Since then, the 
business sector has understood that it takes a foreign exchange currency position at its own peril. In 
addition, the Supervisor of Banks required, as a prudential measure, the boards of directors of 
commercial banks to assess the foreign exchange exposure of their customers in order to avoid 
foreign exchange risk from turning into bank credit risk. As a result the currency mismatch was largely 
reversed as shown in Table 2. BIS Papers No 24  191
 
Table 2 
Foreign exchange currency position of the business sector 
Private sector FX position – excess of FX liabilities over assets 
(End of period, US$ billion) 
  Business sector  Household sector  Banking sector 
1997 16.7  –10.7  –1.6 
1998 12.8  –13.2  –2 
1999 10.9  –14.1  –0.6 
2000 3.6  –14.0  –1.3 
2001 6.7  –16.7  –0.4 
2002 8.8  –19.6  –1.4 
2003 6.7  –22.0  –1.5 
2004-2 0.6  –22.7  –0.8 
 
An interesting feature of the non-intervention policy period is the stability of the new shekel exchange 
rate. Since June 1997, the new shekel has been a very stable currency by international comparison. 
Of particular interest is the fact that the stability of the new shekel stands out even if one compares it 
to countries such as Australia, Canada, Sweden and the UK. These countries are inflation targeters 
that intervene from time to time to smooth out fluctuations in the exchange rate. Israel has had the 
lowest exchange-rate volatility, whether measured by historical volatility or by implied volatility derived 
from foreign exchange options premiums (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
Average of annual historical and implied volatilities 
Various countries during 1997-2004 
 Australia  Canada  Israel  Sweden  UK 
Average historical volatility
1  10.8 6.0  6.1 10.6 7.8 
Average implied volatility
2  11.1 8.6  6.5 11.2 8.8 
1    Average standard deviation of log price change over 10-day period.     
2    Average 1-month implied volatility, 
Feb 2003 - Aug 2004. 
 
The impressive stability of Israel’s exchange rate cannot be attributed to shallowness of the Israeli 
foreign exchange market, which, while certainly less deep than that of the UK and the other three 
countries in Table 3, is not a thin market. Since June 1997, daily average turnover grew from a level 
US$ 0.5 billion to US$ 1.6 billion; other indicators, such the bid-offer spread, also show that the foreign 
exchange market is maturing. We believe that the stability of the exchange rate is a result of decisions 
taken by many players (domestic and foreign) with different needs and heterogeneous expectations, 
who know from experience that they cannot rely on BOI intervention in the foreign exchange market. 
Under these conditions speculation tends to be a stabilising factor, thus enhancing financial stability. 
An indication of the stability of the foreign exchange market, which contributes to overall financial 
stability, is the probability of a large depreciation derived from BOI foreign exchange call options 
(Figure 2). Recently this probability has remained very low even when the gap between the BOI key 
rate and the federal funds rate narrowed considerably. 
The most recent sharp increase in this probability occurred in the first quarter of 2002, following an 
unexpected 2% cut of the BOI interest rate as part of a package agreed with the government, which 
was not honored by all parties. According to the deal, the BOI announced a (very surprising) reduction 
of two percentage points in its key rate (from 5.8% to 3.8%) and the government pledged publicly to 
curb its growing deficit. When the deficit kept growing, and against a background of a deteriorating 192  BIS Papers No 24
 
security situation in April 2002, the probability of a 10% depreciation began to grow rapidly. It started 
to decline at the beginning of 2003 only after the key rate was raised sharply in several steps, 
reaching 9.1%, and the government cut transfer payments heavily, which indicated its determination to 
return to a policy of fiscal prudence. It is interesting, except for the episode just described, to note that 
throughout most of the period since 1997, the probability of 10% depreciation remained low in spite of 
many unfavourable shocks which the economy had to endure. 
 
Figure 2 
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IV.  non-intervention policy as a policy force 
Flexible exchange rates tend to reveal unsound policies more quickly than fixed rates and thus exert 
discipline on policy makers. This point, which is made by Tornell and Velasco (2000) and others, is 
particularly relevant for Israel. For historical reasons, going back to the period of three-digit inflation in 
the 1980s, the price of housing in Israel is still linked to the US dollar (Figure  3). The housing 
component is more than 20% of the CPI. Thus, people who buy (sell) or rent houses, as well as 
exporters and importers are quite vulnerable to sharp fluctuations in the dollar exchange rate, and can 
therefore be viewed as lobby against large fluctuations of the exchange rate. 
In particular they dislike those exchange rate fluctuations against which it is difficult or very expensive 
to insure. Those fluctuations are often the result of unsound macroeconomic policies and as a result 
have often caused reversals of these policies. 
The events of the first half of 2002 serve as an illustration of how rapidly both fiscal and monetary 
steps can be reversed in response to pressures from the foreign exchange market and the bond 
market. 
At the end of 2001, following a sharp deterioration in economic activity and the government’s fiscal 
position, and in the face of a very bad security situation, the BOI and the government agreed on a 
package which included a reduction in the key rate from 5.8% to 3.8%; a public promise by the 
government to make the fiscal adjustments necessary to bring the deficit to the level planned earlier BIS Papers No 24  193
 
(3% of GDP) notwithstanding the deep recession in economic activity; removing the last restrictions on 
capital outflows; reducing to zero the slope of the lower limit of the foreign exchange band; and 
removing the ceiling on what is in effect a central bank tradable note (makam), thus giving the BOI 
more operational independence. 
Figure 3 
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All the elements of the package were carried out, except the government’s promise to keep the deficit 
at the targeted level. 
The reduction in the key rate took place in December 2001. When it became clear that the 
government’s deficit for 2002 was going to exceed the agreed limit by a large margin, financial 
markets reacted with a vengeance: the exchange rate depreciated by 17% within six months, foreign 
exchange  volatility rose from 6.4% to 16% (the implied six months volatility derived from foreign 
exchange options), the  yield on the one-year government bond (regular and CPI linked, the latter 
serving as benchmark for  mortgage rates) rose from 6.5% to 11.7% and from 3.8% to 5.8%, 
respectively, within five months. 
These market reactions had strong effects on both monetary and fiscal policies. The BOI increased its 
key rate from 3.8% to 9.1% within four months. The government announced a credible plan of general 
expenditure cuts and welfare expenditure reforms. Later, US government guarantees were received, 
but these were conditional on continued government fiscal prudence. I doubt very much whether the 
corrective measures would have been taken if the BOI had intervened in the foreign exchange market 
and not let the exchange rate respond, or if a long-term bond market and its role as a benchmark for 
mortgages did not exist. 194  BIS Papers No 24
 
 
V.  Conditions for foreign exchange intervention 
Despite the fact that the BOI has not intervened in the foreign exchange market for a period 
approaching a decade, such intervention could not and should not be ruled out in the future. There are 
three main possible reasons for future foreign exchange intervention; monetary policy, malfunctioning 
of the foreign exchange market, foreign exchange reserve accumulation (decumulation). 
Foreign exchange reserves are typically one of several assets on the central bank’s balance sheet, 
and can in principle be used by the central bank to inject (withdraw) liquidity. In the context of an 
inflation targeting framework, where the main policy instrument is the short-term interest rate, buying 
(selling) foreign exchange reserves may be used by the central bank as a signaling device. In 
particular, foreign exchange intervention may signal to the market that the central bank considers 
movements in the exchange rate to be excessive in relation to what the central bank thinks are the 
fundamentals. In order for such intervention to be effective, the central bank must have established a 
high degree of credibility in carrying out its main task, which is maintaining price stability. Since 
non-sterilised foreign exchange intervention is appropriately viewed as a legitimate monetary 
operation, any attempt by the government to restrict movements of the exchange rate means that the 
Central Bank is not in full control of its balance sheet. This in turn means that it is not entirely free with 
respect to the use of monetary instruments. The BOI has been pressing to change the current BOI law 
from 1954 which, among other important changes, would discard the band.  
Another reason for intervention is to deal with microstructure-type failures resulting in a collapse of 
liquidity of the foreign exchange market. In a sense, the central bank’s foreign exchange operation in 
this situation plays the role of the provider of liquidity of the last resort to the market. Before 
intervening for this purpose it is important to determine the reason for such failures. For instance, there 
might be sudden jumps in the market-making activity of banks in the foreign exchange market. 
Another reason for foreign exchange intervention might be the need to add to (deplete) foreign 
exchange reserves. If this is the reason for intervention, the factors that determine the optimal level of 
reserves should be made clear to the public. This has been recently done in Israel where the three 
main reasons for holding reserves were made public and include: a) the need to service the 
government’s foreign debt; b) the option to intervene in the foreign exchange market for monetary 
policy purposes; c) the need to provide liquidity to banks in extreme situations. 
In considering foreign exchange intervention it is important to keep in mind that attempts to work 
against the market are generally doomed to fail and that intervention should be transparent and not 
secretive as it used to be in the past. It is important that the strategy of intervention be clear at all 
times. This does mean that the detail of every intervention be made public in real time. 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper has given the reasons why for a period approaching a decade the Bank of Israel did not 
intervene in the foreign exchange market. It has pointed out that the non-intervention policy enhanced, 
within an inflation targeting regime, the credibility and effectiveness of monetary policy. This policy 
also contributed a great deal to the internalisation of foreign exchange risk by the private sector, thus 
enhancing financial stability. Last but not least, letting the exchange rate be determined by market 
forces exerted market discipline on policy makers, thus increasing the chances that unsound policies 
will be reversed quickly. BIS Papers No 24  195
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